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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
MARY HATHAWAY, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
-vs.-
JAY L. MARX, FLOYD A. 
MARX, d/b/a CARBON 
ANIMAL BY-PRODUCTS 
COMPANY, and 
LUEY HADDOCK, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
Case No. 
11030 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action by the plaintiff-appellant 
against the defendants-respondents to recover for 
the personal injuries to said plaintiff-appellant re-
sulting from an automobile collision. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The case was tried before the Honorable Judge 
Joseph E. Nelson, sitting with a jury. The jury 
brought in a verdict of no cause of action. Subse-
quently, the plaintiff filed a motion for a new trial 
which, after argument by counsel for the parties 
and submission of Memorandums of Law, was de-
nied. 
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in ten ti on of making a left turn across said highway 
onto the dirt portion of the Lake Boren Road which 
' intersected with Highway 40 and ran in an easterly 
and westerly direction. As respondents' truck ap-
proched the intersection, the turn signals were oper-
a ting (TR 126), indicating a left-hand turn. As he 
began his left turn, the plaintiff's vehicle, which was 
attempting to pass him on the left, collided with the 
respondents' truck, resulting in the alleged injuries 
to the plaintiff. The plaintiff, along with her chil-
dren, was also southbound on Highway 40. As she 
approached the respondents' truck, which was mov-
ing at a slow rate of speed, she attempted to pass 
on the left side in the northbound lane of travel, 
during which attempt the collision occurred. Had 
she stayed in the southbound lane, she would have 
avoided the respondents' truck (TR 128). 
The point of impact was in the northbound lane 
of traffic and within the confines of the intersection 
of U.S. 40 with the Lake Boren Road. See plaintiff's 
Exhibits 1 and 2. 
The Lake Boren Road is asphalt west of the 
internection and dirt east of the intersection. U.S. 
Highway ,10 is generally a two-lane highway, one 
northbound lane and one southbound lane; however, 
in the area of the intersection where the collision 
occurred, U.S. 40 is a four-lane highway inasmuch 
8,s two separate and distinctly marked acceleration 
and deceleration lanes have been placed on each side 
of the road for cars to enter onto U.S. 40 and exit 
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U.S. 40 from the Lake Boren Road either from the 
east or west (TR 14-15). The acceleration and de-
celeration lanes commence approximately one-tenth 
of a mile or 600 feet north of the Lake Boren inter-
section (TR 11, and also see plaintiff's Exhibit 4). 
The acceleration and deceleration lanes are marked 
with a broken white line. The lane marking stripes 
do not continue across the area encompassing the 
Lake Boren intersection but continue on the other 
side of the intersection (see plaintiff's Exhibit 4). 
Both the dirt and paved roads intersect Highway 
40 at 90° angles, and stop signs are located at the 
intersection of both the dirt road and the paved road 
with U.S. Highway 40 (see plaintiff's Exhibits 5 
and 3 and TR 16) . North of the intersection, from 
which direction the plaintiff was traveling, there is 
a rise in the topography over which U.S. 40 passes. 
The Lake Boren Road intersection is visible from 
that rise, which is approximately a half mile away 
from the intersection (TR 34 and 67). As the plain-
tiff proceeded over the rise, she could see the inter-
section (TR 34) and the widened out portion of the 
highway (TR 67) . 
Both the paved portion and the dirt portion of 
the Lake Boren Road were traveled by the public; 
however, the paved portion was traveled more fre-
quently, especially in the fishing season (TR 18-19). 
During the voir dire of the jury, it was discov-
ered that one of the prospective jurors, Reed Stans-
field, was an eye witness to the accident and was 
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accordingly dismissed from jury duty. He was sub-
sequently put on the stand by the defendants and 
testified that he was behind the plaintiff and de-
fendant at the time the collision occurred, that he 
definitely saw the defendant's signal lights operat-
ing, that the defendant had commenced his turn and 
was in the northbound lane of traffic when the col-
lision occurred, and that had the plaintiff stayed in 
her lane of traffic a collision would not have occur-
red. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE E V I D E N C E PRESENTED CLEARLY 
PROVIDES SUFFICIENT BASIS TO SUPPORT 
A CONCLUSION BY THE JURY THAT THE 
INTERSECTION OF THE PAVED LAKE BOR-
EN ROAD AND THE DIRT ROAD WITH U.S. 
HIGHWAY 40 WAS AN INTERSECTION AS 
DEFINED BY THE S TATU TE S OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH. 
It should first be noted that appellant's Points 
I and II will be treated jointly under respondents' 
Point I herein. 
The issues as framed by appellant's Points I 
and II are not a full and complete statement of the 
issue. The only possible question arising out of the 
trial in connection with the negligence of the plain-
tiff for passing within an intersection or within 100 
feet thereof as provided in Utah Code Annotated, 
41-6-58 is whether or not there is sufficient evi-
' dence to support a verdict by the jury that said in-
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tersection was in fact an "intersection," as defined 
in the Utah statutes and as contemplated in the 
above-cited provision. Of course, there is no way of 
knowing that the jury even considered this as an ele-
ment in finding against the plaintiff; however, for 
the purposes of argument we shall assume that the 
basis of the jury verdict was the negligence of the 
plaintiff for passing within an intersection or with-
in 100 feet thereof. The appellant in her Point II 
merely reiterates her point in Point I, that the meet-
ing of the U.S. Highway 40 and the dirt and paved 
roads was not an intersection. Obviously, the court 
was justified in giving an instruction concerning the 
possible negligence of the plaintiff passing at an in-
tersection if there was any evidence to substantiate 
the fact that it was an intersection and that she 
had passed within 100 feet of the intersection. See 
Adamson vs. United Mine Workers, 3 Utah 2nd 37, 
177 Pac. 2nd 972 ( 1954) in regards to the "any 
evidence" rule. However, before we take up the fac-
tual question it should also be pointed out that ap-
pellant's Point II is misleading in that it attempts to 
give the impression that the court instructed as 
a matter of law that an intersection did exist at that 
point. The instructions read as a whole and not out of 
context as the appellant places them shows what the 
court obviously meant to do was to present to the 
jury the question of whether or not there was an 
intersection, and if so, whether or not the plaintiff 
had attempted to pass within the confines of the 
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intersection or within 100 feet thereof. The instruc-
tions as fully given are as follows: 
INSTRUCTION NO. 5 
'"Even though you find the proposition set 
forth in the next proceeding instruction in 
favor of the plaintiff, nevertheless, the claim 
of the plaintiff may be barred by contributory 
negligence on her part. 
"Before contributory negligence would pre-
clude plaintiff's recovery, the defendant has 
the burden of proving by a preponderance of 
the evidence that the two propositions are 
true: 
PROPOSITION NO. 1 
"That the plaintiff was negligent in the 
operation of her automobile immediately prior 
to the collision in one or more of the following 
particulars : 
(a) Plaintiff drove at a speed which was 
greater than was reasonable and prudent un-
der the circumstances ; 
(b) Plaintiff attempted to pass to the left 
of a vehicle at an intersection when it was 
unlawful to do so; 
( c) Plaintiff failed to yield the right of 
way to defendant's vehicle; 
( d) Plaintiff failed t~ maintain a .reason-
able lookout for other vehicles on the highway. 
PROPOSITION NO. 2 
"That the negligence of the plaintiff, if 
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any, proximately contributed in producing her 
own injuries and damage. . 
"If you find the foregoing propositions 
against the plaintiff, she cannot recover." 
INSTRUCTION NO. 16 
''The laws of this state provide that the 
driver of any vehicle overtaking another ve-
hicle proceeding in the same direction shall 
pass at a safe distance to the left thereof and 
shall not again drive to the right side of the 
roadway until safely clear of the overtaken 
vehicle. 
"The driver shall, when reasonably neces-
sary to insure safe operation, give an audible 
warning with his horn, but shall not otherwise 
use such horn. 
"No vehicle shall at any time be driven to 
the left side of the roadway when approach-
ing the crest of a grade or upon a curve in a 
highway where the driver's view is obstruct-
ed within such distance as to create a hazard 
in the event another vehicle might approach 
from the opposite direction or when approach-
ing within 100 feet of or traversing any in-
tersection. 
"The driver of a motor vehicle shall not 
follow another vehicle more closely than is 
reasonable and prudent having due regard to 
the speed of such vehicle, the traffic upon and 
the condition of the highway. 
"The driver of any vehicle upon a highway, 
before turning from a direct course or moving 
right or left upon a roadway, shall first see 
that the movement can be made with reason-
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able safety and whenever the operation of an-
other vehicle may be affected by such move-
~e!lt shall give .a signal as required plainly 
v1s1ble to the driver of such other vehicle of 
the intention to make such movement. The 
signal herein required shall be given either 
by means of the hand and arm in the manner 
herein specified or by approved mechanical 
electrical signal device, and whenever the sig-
nal is given by means of the hand and arm the 
driver shall indicate his intention by extend-
ing the hand and arm horizontally from and 
beyond the left side of the vehicle. 
"A failure to comply with the foregoing 
requirements would constitute negligence." 
In light of the instructions as given, it is obvi-
ous that the instructions merely stated the possible 
alternatives of negligence which the jury could find, 
and did not instruct the jury, as the appellant as-
serts, that there was as a matter of law an inter-
section at the point of the accident. 
However, the evidence and the pleadings on file 
herein obviously constituted sufficient evidence upon 
which a jury could find that the meeting of U.S. 
Highway 40 with the Lake Boren paved and dirt 
road was an intersection, and that that evidence was 
also sufficient to justify the court in finding as a 
matter of law that it was an intersection, had the 
court been so inclined to do so. 
The verdict need only be supported by some 
competent evidence. The requirement of some com-
petent evidence for that point was clearly satisfied 
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by the testimony which established the existence of 
the acceleration and deceleration lanes which extend-
ed approximately one-tenth of a mile in both direc-
tions from the intersection of U.S. Highway 40 and 
the Lake Boren paved and dirt roads. The appellant 
would have the court believe that there were no in-
dications of an intersection and no markings pro-
hibiting passing in that area. The basis of that er-
roneous assumption appears to be derived from the 
appellant's reading of the case of Douglas vs. Gigan-
det, 8 Utah 2nd 245, 332 Pac. 2nd 932 (1958). 
A close examination of that case will show that it does 
not say what appellant would have it say. In that 
case the defendant, who was the passing vehicle, had 
filed a counterclaim against the plaintiff. The trial 
court entered a no cause of action against all parties. 
The defendant appealed on the grounds that it was 
error to instruct that the defendant had a duty to 
use due care to observe that the vehicle of the plain-
tiff was approaching at a point at which a side road 
departed from the highway and also in instructing 
that the defendant had no right to attempt to pass 
the plaintiff's vehicle at an intersection. The court 
held there that the Peters Point Road was not a 
highway or road, and therefore could not meet the 
statutory definition of an intersection. That was the 
extent of the holding of the case. In the court's dis-
cussion leading up to its conclusion, the court indi-
cated that there was nothing to indicate a turnoff 
road from the highway and no markers showing 
that a road left the highway anywhere in the area. 
l () 
From this statement of fact the plaintiff appears 
to evolve a specific test in determining the existence 
of an intersection. It appears to respondent that the 
supreme court did not intend such statement as the 
test, and certainly not as an exclusive test. But even 
if such statement were the test, the present situation 
would still fall within that definition since the accel-
eration and deceleration lanes were an obvious mark-
ing on the road from which every observant motor-
ist could conclude that there was a special situation 
in that area of U.S. Highway 40 allowing for the 
entrance and exit of vehicles from either side of the 
Lake Boren Road (TR 34). The appellant herself 
testified that when she was at the crest of the hill 
to the north she could see from that point the widen-
ed portion of the road in front of her. 
The testimony of the police officer shows that 
the Lake Boren Road to the west of Highway 40 
was a paved county road which was publicly travel-
ed and a maintained highway and that stop signs 
were placed on the east and west sides of the inter-
section of U.S. Highway 40 and the Lake Boren 
Roads. He also testified that the dirt portion of the 
Lake Boren Road, which proceeded east from High-
way 40 also was publicly traveled, although not as 
much as Highway 40 or the paved portion of the 
Lake Boren Road. Of course, the fact that the dirt 
and paved portions of the Lake Boren Road were not 
used to the extent of Highway 40 is not in any way 
determinative of their status. In th~ present case the 
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evidence shows that the two intersecting roads, U.S. 
Highway 40 and the paved and dirt portion of the 
Lake Boren Road, both came within the definition 
of a road or highway as set forth in the Utah Code 
Annotated 1953, 41-6-7: 
"(a) Street or Highway. The entire width 
between the boundary lines of every way pub-
licly maintained when any part thereof is 
open to the use of the public for purposes of 
vehicular travel." 
An examination of the cases set forth in 53 ALR 
2nd 861 show that such a road as the Lake Boren 
Road, where it is partially paved, publicly maintain-
ed, and publicly used, is within the classification of 
a highway or street for the purposes of this lawsuit. 
Once it is determined that the Lake Boren Road is a 
highway or road within the statutory contemplation, 
the problem faced in Doiiglas vs. Gigandet has been 
resolved. 
The statutes of the State of Utah define an in-
tersection as being : 
"The area embraced within the prolonga-
tion or connection of the lateral curblines, or, 
if none, then the lateral boundary lines of the 
roadways of two highways which join one an-
other at, or approximately at, right angles, or 
the area within which vehicles traveling upon 
different highways joining at any other angle 
come in conflict." Utah Code Annotated 1953, 
41-6-8 
U.S. Highway 40 and the Lake Boren Road, being 
roads or highways under the statutory definition, 
their connection is by definition an intersection 
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without further proof. However, even if we were to 
accept the proposition of the plaintiff that an inter-
section must also have signs and markings so indi-
cating the intersection of roads, the evidence in this 
case establishes such signs and markings: the wid-
ened highway extended on both sides of the inter-
section with clearly defined acceleration and decel-
eration lanes proceeding from the intersecting Lake 
Boren Road, and the existence of stop signs on both 
sides of U.S. Highway 40 where the dirt and paved 
portions of the road intersect. It is obvious that any 
driver attentive to the conditions in front of him 
as he came over the rise north of the intersection 
would observe these markings and signs delineating 
the existence of the two intersecting roads. 
The appellant in her Point I attempts to assert 
that there is no intersection within the statutory 
contemplation unless the Utah Highway Department 
has marked the intersection according to the Manual 
on Uniform Traffic Control Devices for Streets and 
Highways published by the United States Depart-
ment of Commerce. First of all, the Manual, which 
appellant freely quotes from in her Brief, was never 
presented as evidence in this case, and is now be-
ing asserted on appeal by the appellant. The Manual 
merely suggests procedures which the Highway De-
partment should adopt. However, it is not in any 
way connected with the statutory definition of an 
intersection, and furthermore it is incompetent evi-
dence before the Court at this time. The Court on 
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many occasions has held that evidence not presented 
in the case prior to appeal was incompetent and 
should not be considered on appeal. Cooper vs. For-
resters Underwriters, Inc., 257 Pac. 2nd 540, 123 
Utah 215, where the court held that it could not look 
dehors the record on appeal and consider facts stated 
in briefs but absent from the official record. And 
also in the case of Watkins vs. Simonds, 385 Pac. 
2nd 154, 14 Utah 2nd 406, the court held that the 
appellate court could not consider facts stated in 
briefs which may be true but which are not present 
in the official record. The same was held also in the 
case of Reliable Furniture Company vs. Fidelity & 
Guaranty Insitrance Underwriters, Inc., 380 Pac. 
2nd 135, 14 Utah 2nd 169. Respondents concede that 
the applicable Utah statutes, which the appellant 
cites, are properly presented to the Court; however, 
the Manual carries no such status and therefore is 
improper in the appellant's Brief and should be dis-
regarded. The appellant argues in her Point I that 
the intersection was not marked as the Highway De-
partment may have marked other intersections. The 
obvious answer to this is that the actions of the 
State Road Commission do not control the question 
of whether an intersection exists as defined in the 
previously cited statute. The State Road Commission 
has been delegated authority over the control of traf-
fic throughout the state, and how they carry out 
their obligation is not determinative of the issue be-
fore the Court. 
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The respondents contention, therefore, is that 
the Lake Boren Road was obviously a public high-
way, that it created an intersection where it inter-
sected with Highway 40, and that the existence of 
stop signs and the acceleration and deceleration 
lanes is additional evidence of such intersection. 
It is also interesting to note that the appellant 
apparently sees this intersection question as a last-
minute device to overturn the verdict of the jury, 
for it appears that prior to the trial the appellant 
had no doubts as to it being an intersection. In the 
plaintiff's Complaint in Paragraph Three, the ap-
pellant stated: 
"That at all times herein alleged, the intersec-
tion of Lake Boren Road and U.S. Highway 
40 is an intersection approximately ten miles 
west of Roosevelt, Utah in Duchesne County, 
Utah. (Emphasis ours) 
And in Paragraph Four of said Complaint, the plain-
tiff stated: 
"That on or about the 27th day of June, 1961 
at approximately 11 :30 A.M. plaintiff was 
traveling west on U.S. Highway 40 approach-
ing the Lake Boren Road or intersection and 
the defendant Luey Haddock was traveling 
west ahead of plaintiff; ... " (Emphasis ours) 
In the trial of the action the appellant's counsel fre-
quently referred to the ~'intersection," and now the 
appellant is in the precarious position of questioning 
on appeal whether the jury was entitled to consider 
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the intersection as an intersection. And as to Point 
:rI previously discussed, the appellant is also in the 
peculiar position of complaining of the court's in-
structions wherein reference was made to an inter-
section, when in fact the appellant had herself sub-
mitted a proposed Instruction No. 1, which stated 
in part: 
"That on the 27th day of June, 1961, at ap-
proximately 11 :30 o'clock A.M. plaintiff was 
driving west on U.S. Highway 40 and ap-
proaching the intersection of Lake Boren 
Road, Duchesne County." 
Had plaintiff's instruction been given, would the 
plaintiff now be alleging that it was error to give 
that instruction? And also note plaintiff's Instruc-
tion No. 2, which was given in substance by the court 
in Instruction No. 6, which stated in part: 
" ... It is likewise negligence for the driver of 
a motor vehicle on a public highway to make 
a left-hand turn when it is unsafe to do so by 
reason of a vehicle passing to the left or to 
commence to make a left turn from a public 
highway to an intersection to fail to see a ve-
hicle on the highway there to be seen." 
It appears obvious to the respondents that the 
junction of the Lake Boren Road and U.S. High- , 
way 40 was an intersection within the contemplation 
of the law, that it was properly so considered by the 
jury and even the plaintiff until the jury had re-
turned with its verdict. 
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POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENY-
ING THE PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR NEW 
TRIAL B A S E D ON JURY MISCONDUCT, 
THERE BEING NEITHER COMPETENT EVI-
DENCE BEFORE THE COURT OF SUCH MIS-
CONDUCT NOR A SHOWING OF PREJUDICE 
TO THE PLAINTIFF'S CASE. 
Appellant in her Point III makes a contention 
which is clearly contrary to the well-established law 
in the State of Utah in connection with jury mis-
conduct. She appears to allege that the misconduct 
was on the part of the foreman of the jury in stating 
to the jurors while deliberating in the jury room 
that he had driven by the scene of the accident short-
ly after the accident and had seen there Mr. 
Stansfield, who was one of the defendants' witnes-
ses. Plaintiff at the time of the motion for new trial 
did not in any way support her contention of jury 
misconduct but based her motion merely upon her 
own assertion of such fact as she does in this appeal. 
The fact alone that no affidavits or any other type 
of evidence is before the trial court or this Court is 
sufficient to defeat appellant's contentions in her 
Point III. Respondents have previously in their Point 
I cited the Utah authorities for the proposition that 
evidence not before the trial court is not properly 
before the Supreme Court. In this situation there is 
not any evidence other than the hearsay and self-
serving assertions of the appellant. 
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Respondents note, howeve1·, that even had the 
appellant submitted affidavits to the trial court sup-
porting the allegations of jury misconduct it is clear 
under the Utah law that such affidavits also would 
be incompetent evidence of such misconduct. In 
Rule 59 (A) 2 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
the policy of the State of Utah as to impeaching jury 
verdicts is set down; and there it is provided that 
jury misconduct is provable, and then only by affi-
davit, in two situations: where there has been a quo-
tient or chance verdict, and where the verdict is a 
result of bribery. It was early established in the 
Utah jurisprudence that it was contrary to the pub-
lic policy and the statutes of the State of Utah to 
allow the verdict of a jury to be impeached fo1· jury 
misconduct after is was entered unless it came within 
the two above-prescribed exceptions. People vs. 
Flynn, 75 Utah 378, 26 Pac. 1114 (1891); Horner 
vs. Interrnoimtain Abstract C01npany, 9 Utah 193, 
33 Pac. 700; H epw01'th vs. Covey Bros. Aniusernent 
Conipany, 97 Utah 205, 91 Pac. 2nd 507 ( 1939); 
Morrison vs. Perry, 104 Utah 151, 140 Pac. 2nd 772 
(1943); Wheat vs. Denver & R. G. W.R. Cornpany, 
122 Utah 418, 250 Pac. 2nd 932 (1952); and the 
latest affirmance of this rule is in the case of Srnith 
vs. Barnett, 17 Utah 2nd 240, 408 Pac. 2nd 709 
(1965). 
The appellant has failed to show that the alleg-
ed misconduct p1·ejudiced the verdict against her. In 
the case of Redd vs. Airiooy Motor Coach Lines, Inc., 
18 
104 Utah 9, 137 Pac. 2nd 374 (1943), this Court 
stated on page 22 of the Utah Reports: 
"In denying the motion for new trial on the 
ground of misconduct on the part of the jury, 
the trial court did not abuse its discretion, 
even assuming that on the showing made a 
contrary ruling could be sustained." 
Respondents feel further argument is not neces-
sary along these lines inasmuch as it is clear that 
in the first place there being no competent evidence 
before the trial court or before this Court of mis-
conduct, such issue is therefore non-existent. How-
ever, it is obvious that even assuming that such mis-
conduct did occur and also assuming that the plain-
tiff had proof of such misconduct, it would never-
theless be incompetent evidence; and under the un-
disputed law of the State of Utah, the verdict would 
stand, and the trial court would, under the rule in 
the Redd case, be sustained in its denial of the appel-
lant's motion for a new trial. 
CONCLUSION 
There is clearly no basis for a new trial upon 
the grounds raised by the appellant. The issue of 
misconduct is obviously improperly before the Court 
and is asserted without any basis. The issue concern-
ing the appellant's allegations concerning the inter-
section merely resolves itself down to whether there 
was any evidence upon which the jury could find 
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that it was an intersection, assuming they did. The 
bulk of the appellant's argument under Point I is 
also improperly before the Court inasmuch as it was 
not evidence before the trial court at any stage of 
the proceedings and therefore should not be consid-
ered on appeal. The evidence as set forth shows that 
there was an intersection at the junction of U.S. 40 
and the Lake Boren Roads, that this intersection 
was obvious to any reasonable driver from at least 
one-tenth of a mile away, and that it was indicated 
by the clearly marked acceleration and deceleration 
lanes and stop signs on both sides of the Lake Boren 
Road. The fact that the Lake Boren Road obviously 
met the test of being a public road or highway by 
definition makes its junction with Highway 40 an 
intersection within the contemplation of the Utah 
Law, and the above-mentioned markings and signs 
supplement the basis for finding that the intersec-
tion was an "intersection." Respondents also con-
tend that the appellant cannot claim error in regard 
to the instructions for the reason that in her plead-
ings she has pleaded that the intersection was an 
intersection at all times and in fact asked for in-
structions from the court which referred to the junc- ' 
tion as an intersection. 
Respondents respectfully submit that the appel-
lant's contentions for a new trial and now for relief 
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on appeal are groundless and that the verdict of the 
jury and the trial court's denial of the motion for a 
new trial should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
HANSON & GARRETT 
by W. BRENT WILCOX 
520 Continental Bank Bldg. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
21 
Attorneys for 
Respondents 
